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INTRODUCTION 
The District Court granted defendants5 Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that the 
decision not to market the subject property ("Soldier Summit") in any manner despite 
repeated acknowledgments that they could and would, but intentionally failed to do so, was 
not "willful misconduct" and that plaintiffs did not rely upon such conduct. 
Knowing that the record supports willful misconduct and reliance, Defendants also 
argue that all of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations which the 
District Court did not decide in any manner or way. 
Finally, defendants, knowing that plaintiffs' willful misconduct claims have raised 
material issues of fact, further argue that they did not have any intent to deceive which issue 
was not even briefed or argued in the Court below, much less decided by the Court below. 
Prior to February 1982, Po Chang managed Soldier Summit. (R. 898-900, 1359-60, 
1453.) In February 1982, due to a bitter deteriorating relationship, the Lins and the Changs 
executed an agreement in which the Changs gave up significant assets to the Lins for an 
interest in Soldier Summit, a developed project imminently to be subdivided for sale. 
(R. 873-877.) In 1982, prior to the separation, everyone agreed that the property was ready 
and able to be on the market. (R. 1790-93, 1810, 1821-24, 1802-04, 1825.) After the 
separation, the Lins managed Soldier Summit. (R. 1498-99.) They assured the Changs time 
and again in the 1982-89 time period that the property would be marketed soon. (R. 1810, 
1821-24, 1825, 1802-04.) From 1984 to 1989, plaintiffs continued to request information 
and status of Soldier Summit. (R. 1813.) It was not until 1989 that defendants finally 
informed plaintiffs of their true intent. Defendants did not intend to market the property and 
had not intended to do so since 1982. (R. 1780-81.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' ENTIRE THEORY OF THE CASH WAS A 
WILLFUL FAILURE TO DEVELOP THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY. 
Plaintiffs' entire theory of the case is that the Lins entered into a Separation 
Agreement with the plaintiffs, became dissatisfied with it, were dissatisfied that they gave 
up a portion of their limited partnership in Soldier Summit and used Soldier Summit as a 
vehicle to punish the plaintiffs in this case. The core intent was willful and malicious, as 
supported by the pleadings, supported by the allegations, supported by the evidence and 
supported by plaintiffs' own theory of the case. There was a fiduciary duty, causation and 
damages. For the court to hold as a matter of law that there was no such breach is error. 
Even the court admitted that there was misconduct. As stated in the Memorandum 
Decision, the court stated: 
There is some evidence that defendants refused to provide plaintiffs requested 
information regarding the partnership and that defendants may have misled 
plaintiffs regarding the development prospects for the property. (R. 1906.) 
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Plaintiff Po Chang was in charge of developing Soldier Summit up through the 
Separation Agreement in 1982. At that point, there was submitted testimony from both Jay 
Murphy and Todd Harris who both said that, with very little effort or expense, the property 
could have been on the market in 1982. Jay Murphy, the original project manager for the 
development, was very clear that the objective for the partnership was to develop and market, 
as quickly as possible, the property. Murphy stated as follows: 
I can clearly tell you what the intents were because they weren't an opinion at 
all. It was to buy the land, annex it to the city, subdivide it as quickly as 
possible and market it. (R. 1774.) . . . 
My understanding was that the acquisition of the land was never intended to 
sit and wait for years to do something with it. It was to be purchased and 
developed immediately. It was a long development plan, but sales were to 
occur as fast as possible. That is my total understanding. (R. 1776.) 
Both Jay Murphy and Todd Harris, experienced recreational real estate salespersons, 
stated in the record that the marketing plan was to have at least two plats of the development 
on the market in 1982. Then, when the Lins took over the management of the partnership, 
the development came to an inexplicable halt. No plausible explanations were ever given 
by the Lins, and as a result, the partnership missed a great opportunity to market the property 
in the 1982-1984 time frame and continues even today. 
The Todd Harris Affidavit states as follows: 
3. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, I [was] involved in various respects 
with the development known as Soldier Summit Development, including 
attending meetings with the City Council. 
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4. At that time, the objective of the developers of the property was to 
develop and get portions of that property on the market as soon as possible. 
I assisted, in various ways, to accomplish this objective. With relatively little 
effort or expense, the property could have been on the market in 1982. 
8. I am aware that in early 1982, a dispute between the Lins and the 
Changs arose which led them to a separation of many of the business dealings 
between them. At that time, the Lins, or their representatives, took over the 
management of the Soldier Summit Development from the Changs and their 
representatives. At that time, all work on the project came to an abrupt halt. 
We could not get any information or assistance from the Lins in order to 
complete the development and put the lots on the market in 1982. 
9. In that same approximate time frame, Henry Yen, a representative of 
the Lins and/or their entities, informed me that the Lins had determined not to 
market the property, but they had simply decided to delay the development. 
He had no explanation for this decision by the Lins. It appeared to me they 
were stalling the development. 
10. Based upon my experience in selling mountain real estate lots at that 
time, it is my opinion that due to the Lins' inaction in developing and 
marketing the property in 1982 through 1984, the partnership missed a great 
business opportunity to turn Soldier Summit Development into a viable and 
profitable project. Since 1978 through the present I have been selling 
mountain real estate lots that are very comparable to the original development 
plan that we were working on in Soldier Summit. (R. 1786-88.) 
After Po Chang was no longer in management, and after the separation, and after the 
project came to a screeching halt, the Changs wrote letters to the Lins asking for information 
about the status and progress of the development. On October 26, 1984, Beatrice Chang 
wrote a letter to Henry Yen, who became President of Soldier Summit, as follows: 
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We have repeatedly asked for a meeting on keeping us informed about the 
status and progress of the development of the Soldier Summit Project. We 
need to be assured that all the progress and achievements which we obtained 
before your assumption of management were not jeopardized because of your 
mismanagement. So far, we have not heard one word about a definite plan for 
a meeting. 
We demand once more on having a meeting to keep us informed on all the 
status and activities regarding Soldier Summit. (R. 1813.) 
In response, Henry Yen, President of Soldier Summit, answered the letter of Beatrice 
Chang as follows: 
As you know, Phase I and II of the Soldier Summit project are ready to be 
placed on the market. Therefore; we feel it necessary to have a partnership 
meeting to inform all partners of the progress we have made and to collect 
ideas on how to successfully market the property. (R. 1812.) 
As noted in the Memorandum Decision of the court below, the record is replete with 
the fact that the defendants misled the plaintiffs relating to the development of the 
partnership and withheld information about the status of the property. (R. 1906.) 
At the partnership meeting in December 1984, it was represented to the partners that 
current plans called for water to be used to develop 500 recreational lots, 80 high density lots 
and one motel. (R. 1825.) 
In 1997, Clark Lin, the Chief Executive Officer of all the Lin companies, finally 
admitted that in 1986 the Lins were using their dispute with the Changs as an excuse not to 
develop the property. Mr. Lin testified as follows: 
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Q. So Paragraph C, to summarize then, the reason that the developer had 
not completed the installation and construction of the improvements 
was in essence the disputes that the Lins were having with the Changs 
and the Lin companies. 
A. That's not the only reason. I guess it doesn't say that's the only reason. 
But that's one of the reasons in their mind, too. (R. 1830.) 
Defendants argue, commencing in their brief at 15, what willful misconduct means 
and how cases have construed willful misconduct as opposed to gross negligence, negligence 
or business judgment. That portion of the argument is superfluous. Plaintiffs' entire theory 
of the case is based upon willful misconduct and fraud in failure to develop the property. 
Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that the Lins entered into the Separation Agreement, became 
dissatisfied with it, and Defendants' core intent was willful and malicious. Defendants 
define willful misconduct as the intentional failure to do an act with knowledge that serious 
injury is the probable result. Defendants' actions as against the plaintiffs and willful failure 
to develop in this instance was the intentional failure to do an act with knowledge that serious 
injury would result and that defendants intended to cause the harm. 
Curiously, the defendants try to reframe the issue before the Court. The defendants 
state in their brief at page 10 that the issue in the court below was not whether the general 
partner willfully failed to develop the property, but whether non-sale of the property is 
"willful misconduct." That is not plaintiffs' theory of the case, and it was not the issue 
decided by the court below. As stated in the court below, the issue decided by the court was 
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whether "failing to develop the property" constituted willful misconduct is supported by the 
pleadings and the record. (R. 1904.) It is not the non-sale of the property that is at issue. 
The issue is the failure to develop the property so that it could be sold. 
Defendants attempt to support their claim of no willful misconduct by merely 
contradicting the record in the case. The defendants state as follows: 
They [defendants] could not sell the lots during that time because they were 
not ready, and even if they had marketed the lots during that time, they would 
have lost money, as subsequent studies show. (Appellees' Brief at 18). 
There is no reference to the record for that statement and it borders on recklessness. 
Po Chang said that the lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1790-1801.) Todd Harris said that the 
lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1785-88.) Jay Murphy, the original project manager, said that 
the lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1769-77.) Henry Yen, the Lins' representative and 
President of Soldier Summit after the separation, said that the lots were ready to be sold. 
(R. 1810-12.) Clark Lin said that the lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1821-25.) 
It was not until October 29, 1989 that defendants stated that the business and 
marketing outlook for Soldier Summit was bleak and that the property would not be 
marketed any time soon using as two excuses: a theft of aspen trees and prior expenditures. 
(R. 1826-27.) 
In their brief, at page 18, defendants refer to a January 1986 Kasper Report that the 
proposed development would result in economic loss and, therefore, the property could not 
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be developed. Interestingly, Sandra Lin never used the Kasper Report as an excuse not be 
market the property in her October 29,1989 letter to the Changs. (R. 1826-27.) 
Second, the Kasper Report was never provided to the Changs until after this litigation 
commenced even though the Kasper Report is dated three years earlier. 
Third, in 1985, Clark Lin, a consultant for IID and, later in 1987, Chief Executive 
Officer of Soldier Summit, prepared a business plan for the development wherein he 
projected sales in 1985, 1986 and 1987 with revenues of at least $2 million dollars and 
projected a $30 to $300 million dollar company by 1995. Lin's report states: 
Soldier Summer Development has both long term and short term objectives. 
The short term objective is to recover the investment and become a self-
sustained economic entity by the end of 1987. The long term goal of the 
development is to achieve a $30-to-$300 million dollar company by 1995. 
The short term development goal can be sequentially accomplished in three 
phases: (1) Phase 1 (1985): Develop Plat C and sell 15 lots. Complete Master 
Plan. (2) Phase 2 (1986): Sell 15 lots. Get approval of Master Plan. (3) 
Phase 3 (1987): Sell 15 lots. (R. 1822.) 
Lin's report is contrary to the Kasper Report. 
Fourth, prior to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Kasper Report was never even 
subject to discovery and Kasper was never deposed. Discovery of expert witness testimony 
was to continue after the Motion for Summary Judgment on factual disputes was argued. 
(R. 1565.) 
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Finally, and more interestingly, the Kasper Report does not even say it was 
economically unfeasible. The Kasper Report assumes the success of the project. In fact, the 
Kasper Report is more "bullish" about the sale of lots than even Lin's report. Clark Lin, to 
obtain $30 to 300 million dollars by 1995, assumed only 15 lots per year sold. The Kasper 
Report assumes 20 to 30 lots per year sold. (R. 1521.) 
Defendants also mention a report from Robert Wietzke to show that it was not 
economically feasible to market Soldier Summit (Appellees' Brief at 8). 
First, the Wietzke report was not prepared until January 24, 1996. (R. 1557). 
Wietzke, an expert, was never deposed prior to argument on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Expert witnesses, although scheduled, had not been commenced or completed in 
accordance with the Court's Scheduling Order. (R. 1565.) 
Second, the cost assumptions used by Wietzke were based on a report by a company 
called Tuttle Engineering, a report never produced to plaintiffs through discovery and never 
seen by plaintiffs although requested. (R. 1552-53.) 
Third, these estimates and descriptions are flatly contradicted by the City of Soldier 
Summit's own requirements as to what was needed for completion of the project. The 
schedule of on-site improvements remaining were further road work, a water pickup station, 
culverts, and an entrance road. (R. 1836-37.) Tuttle Engineering assumed the installation of 
a sewer system, an underground electric power system, and a complete water system, not 
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even required by the City and never envisioned to be built by anyone prior to the filing of this 
action. (R. 1552-53.) Wietzke's report not only raises material issues of fact, but it is 
ludicrous on its face. 
Defendants also assert that in April 1984, the state of Utah dissolved the town of 
Soldier Summit and was thereafter subject to the jurisdiction of Utah County which imposed 
substantially more strict and difficult conditions for subdivision approval. (Appellee's Brief 
at 6). That statement is not only contradicted, but false. 
While Soldier Summit was dissolved, the Special Service District continued in 
existence and the District was bound, which it never denied, by its Agreement with Soldier 
Summit to permit the development to go forward. (R. 1832-1833.) 
Defendants finally assert that the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rejected 
the project's registration. That statement is also false (Appellees' Brief at 6). According to 
Jay Murphy, the only thing needed to finalize the HUD registration was "just some additional 
legal work." (R. 1771). 
Defendants' cases are inapposite. Defendants cite Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 
577 (Utah App. 1998). The only issue in Reedeker was that the plaintiff in Reedeker argued 
that the trial court erred in ruling that his failure to allege intentional misconduct did not 
defeat his tort claims for negligence, gross negligence and breach of duty of care against a 
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non-profit corporation. In this case, plaintiffs have not only alleged, but plaintiffs' theory 
of the case is, intentional willful misconduct and fraud unlike Reedeker. 
Defendants also cite C & Y Corp. v. General & Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47 (Utah 
App. 1995). In C & Y. former directors of a corporation brought suit against a corporation 
claiming breach of contract. After a non-jury trial, the trial court found that the directors had 
not breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation. C & Y has no applicability to this case. 
Defendants also cite Cincinnati Bell Cellular Systems Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Phone 
Systems. 1996 W.L. 506906 (Del. Ch. 1996), affd. 692 A.2d 411 (Del. 1997), which merely 
held that the general partner would not be liable for any loss to the partnership by reason of 
any act or failure to act unless the general partner was guilty of willful misconduct or gross 
negligence. In this case, as argued above, there is ample evidence of willful misconduct and 
even admissions of willful misconduct by defendants5 Chief Executive Officer. The Court 




THE EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR FRAUD AND 
MISREPRESENTATION DOES STATE CLAIMS FOR 
RELIEF AND ARE SUPPORTED BY THE ALLEGATIONS. 
PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE AND THE RECORD. 
CREATING GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
THUS PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The sole issue the court must decide as to this point is whether the Motion for 
Summary Judgment was properly granted as to the fraud and misrepresentations claims 
contained in the Eighth Claim for Relief. Defendants assert that the Eighth Claim should 
have been properly dismissed because there was no intent to deceive and no detrimental 
reliance. 
A. Intent to Deceive is Clearly Manifested. 
First, the issue of intent to deceive was not even briefed or raised in the court below, 
much less decided by the court below. In most situations, intent is a question of fact for the 
trier of fact because the intent may be inferred. In this case, intent to deceive need not even 
be inferred. The intent to deceive is patently manifest. See Galloway v. AFCO Development 
Corp., 777 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989). As stated in Galloway, the court stated with respect 
to the element of intent as follows: 
The intent to deceive, required for common law fraud, may be inferred where 
a misrepresentation is voluntarily communicated to the victim with knowledge 
that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false, but knowing that 
the victim is likely to rely on it. 
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Thus, as noted in Pace v. Parrish. it is sometimes said that a 'reckless' 
misrepresentation made 'knowing that [the misrepresenter] had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representation' is tantamount to the intent to 
deceive. 
777 P.2d at 509. 
Further, intent need not be shown where the victim stands in a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship with the misrepresenter. It is a fundamental characteristic of 
partnership that the partners' relationship with one another is one of trust and confidence 
when dealing with each other in partnership matters. 
In all matters connected with the partnership, the general partner is bound to act in a 
manner not to obtain any advantage over his co-partner in the partnership affairs by the 
slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any kind. Leff v. 
Gunter, 189 Cal. Rptr. 377, 658 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1984). Intent need not be shown where the 
victim, the Changs, stands in a confidential relationship with the misrepresenter. 
The Lins cite Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mevers. 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994) 
and Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982). Those cases 
are clearly inapposite. Neither case involves a fiduciary relationship as in this case. In 
Andalex. the only evidence that the counterclaim plaintiff asserted against the alleged 
defrauder was basically no evidence. The counterclaim plaintiffs evidence consisted of a 
denial by the counterclaim defendant that it had ever made the promise claimed to be 
fraudulent. 
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In this case, you have the following: (1) in 1984, defendants represented to plaintiffs 
and Jay Murphy, previously the project manager of Soldier Summit, in writing that the 
Soldier Summit property would soon be on the market (R. 1810-12, 1802); (2) from 1984 to 
1989, plaintiffs repeatedly requested information, including financial and status reports, 
about Soldier Summit but did not receive the information requested (R. 1813, 1802-07); 
(3) in 1985, Clark Lin, then a consultant to IID, prepared a business plan for Soldier Summit 
wherein he projected sales in 1985, 1986 and 1987 with revenues of at least $2 million 
dollars and projected a $30 to $300 million dollar company by 1995 (R. 1821-24); 
(4) throughout the 1980s, the Lins made representations to the Changs that Soldier Summit 
would be marketed soon (R. 1813, 1802-07); (5) at the partnership meeting in December 
1984, it was represented to the partners that current plans called for water to be used to 
develop 500 recreational lots, 80 high density lots, and one motel (R. 1825); (6) in 1997, 
Clark Lin, the chief executive officer of all the Lin companies, finally admitted that in 1986, 
the Lins were using their dispute with the Changs as an excuse not to develop the property 
(R. 1830); and (7) it was not until 1989, for the first time, despite repeated assurances, that 
the Lins informed the Changs that the property would not be marketed. (R. 1802-07, 
1826-27.) 
Similarly, Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. L 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982) is 
also not helpful to the defendants. First, Cerritos was appellate review of a directed verdict 
-14-
after both parties had presented their evidence. Second, the counterplaintiffs in Cerritos were 
urging the Utah Supreme Court to find that a representation would be actionable in fraud 
because, although it may have been the alleged defrauder's intention to perform pursuant to 
the representation made, they were negligent in formulating that intention. The Court in 
Cerritos was correctly unwilling to find that to be fraud. The Court in Cerritos. however, 
recognized the long-standing rule in this jurisdiction as follows: 
The jurisprudence of this state has long recognized as actionable deceit a 
promise accompanied by the present intention not to perform it, made for the 
purpose of deceiving the promisee, thereby inducing him to act where 
otherwise he would not have done so, and by virtue of which he parts with his 
money or property. 
645P.2dat611. 
As to the facts of this case, defendants assert that there was no present intention to 
deceive because (1) plaintiffs balked at paying certain contributions and (2) development 
of a marketing plan, the Kasper market study in 1986, showed that the recreational lots 
would not be profitable. (Appellees' Brief at 24-25.) That statement is inherently incredible. 
The contributions plaintiffs balked at paying was a contribution that the court below found 
that plaintiffs did not owe, namely, the mortgage on the partnership's property. According 
to the partnership agreements, the mortgage was an expense liability and debt not owed by 
plaintiffs. The court below stated: 
According to Paragraph 5, and ' [notwithstanding any other provision of the 
Partnership Agreement, all pre-March 1982 debts or obligations of the 
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partnership are deemed personal obligations of the General Partner. There is 
no suggestion that the General Partner be credited for these payments as cash 
contributions to the partnership. . . . Plaintiffs gave up their substantial 
interests in other assets in order to receive a partnership free of all debts. It 
would be contrary to the intent of the parties to explicitly preclude the 
mortgage payments as debts of the Limited Partner, while allowing those 
payments as contributions of the General Partner. (R. 1903.) 
Defendants knew that plaintiffs believed that they were not liable for such 
contributions. See Letter dated October 26,1984 to Henry Yen from Beatrice Chang stating: 
We have clearly stated our position with reference to Soldier Summit 
Development Company's payments in the past years. We hereby request that 
you stop all harassment for any expenses which are not our responsibility." 
(R. 1813.) 
The books and records of the partnership (first partially obtained by plaintiffs in 1989) 
clearly show that defendants were in fact paying the mortgage, a debt they had contractually 
assumed, while crediting their capital account thus essentially wiping out any equity the 
plaintiffs had in the property. (R. 1818.) Not only did the books and records show no equity 
of plaintiffs, the books falsely showed that money was owed by the plaintiffs to the 
partnership. 
Moreover, the assertion that the Kasper market study states that the property as 
recreational lots would not be profitable is simply not true. The Kasper Report in no way 
indicates that the marketing of the property would be unprofitable. (R. 1519-51.) 
Todd Harris testified that "the partnership missed a great business opportunity to turn 
Soldier Summit Development into a viable and profitable project." (R. 1787.) 
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Finally, the fact that defendants continued to assure plaintiffs that the property would 
be on the market soon in 1984 and 1985 and then not inform the plaintiffs in 1989 that it 
would probably not be marketed at all does clearly infer that the defendants, through 
Mr. Yen, were lying. 
B. No Detrimental Reliance Need be Shown Because of the Confidential 
Relationship and Detrimental Reliance Did. In Fact. Occur. 
The court below held that, even assuming misrepresentation and fraud by the fiduciary 
defendants, plaintiffs, as a matter of law, sustained no injury whatsoever in reliance upon 
defendants' alleged misrepresentations regarding either development prospects for the 
partnership property or financial information supplied by defendants. 
As this court has noted, reasonable reliance must be considered with references to the 
facts of each case, and is usually a question for the jury to determine. Berkeley Bank for 
Coops v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980). 
Defendants are fiduciaries in all matters connected with the partnership. The general 
partner is bound to act in a manner not to obtain any advantage over his co-partner in the 
partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure 
of any kind. 
Plaintiffs had no managerial control pursuant to limited partnership law whatsoever 
except recourse to legal process. 
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They were required, as a matter of law, to rely upon defendants to act in the utmost 
good faith because they could not, by law, assist in management of the partnership for 
partnership purposes. The law absolutely presumes that there is detrimental reliance as a 
matter of law. The Court in Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), cited 
approvingly of the following language: 
A course of dealing between persons so situated is watched with extreme 
jealousy and solicitude, and if there is found the slightest trace of undue 
influence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the injured party. 
(Citation omitted.) 
590 P.2d at 302. 
Further, there is detrimental reliance in fact. The court below found that there was 
evidence that defendants refused to provide plaintiffs requested information regarding the 
partnership and that defendants had mislead plaintiffs regarding the development prospects 
for the property. (R. 1904.) Defendants lied to the plaintiffs regarding Soldier Summit. On 
January 5, 1984, Mr. Yen indicated that the Soldier Summit Development was nearing 
completion and that they would have the lots on the market by spring. (R. 1810.) 
Defendants lied about Soldier Summit when they stated that they were confident that 1984 
would be a good year for Soldier Summit. (R. 1810.) Defendants lied about defendants' 
actual intentions in marketing the property when they stated that the Soldier Summit property 
was "very close to being placed on the market." (R. 1811.) Defendants lied about the 
financial condition of the partnership when they were requesting contributions that were not 
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otherwise required. (R. 1813.) Defendants lied as to when they were going to market the 
property when they said that the Soldier Summit project was ready to be placed on the 
market. (R. 1812, 1789-1807.) Defendants lied that the short term development goal was 
to sell 15 lots during the years 1985, 1986 and 1987. (R. 1821-24.) Defendants lied about 
the project when defendants stated that the short term objective was to recover the investment 
and become a self sustained economic entity by the end of 1987 and that the long term goal 
of the development was to achieve a $300 million dollar company by 1995. (R. 1821-24.) 
Defendants lied in the partnership meeting dated December 27, 1984 when they stated that 
current plans called for development of 500 recreational lots, 80 high density lots and one 
motel in the financial books of the partnership. (R. 1825.) Defendants lied by asserting that 
plaintiffs owed money for a debt that plaintiffs did not owe. (R. 1813.) Defendants 
alternatively concealed that lie by not providing the financial information after repeated 
requests. (R. 1813-19.) 
In the 1984-1985 time period, when defendants were lying to plaintiffs about the 
property and, alternatively, concealing information, plaintiffs forbore any action. They could 
have dissolved the partnership in 1984. They could have filed a lawsuit in 1984. They could 
have sought legal redress in 1984. They could have sued for rescission of the 1982 
separation agreement in 1984. Plaintiffs gave up significant assets to obtain their percentage 
share in Soldier Summit. They could have dissolved the separation agreement to reacquire 
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the assets given up in acquiring their percentage interest in Soldier Summit. Plaintiffs did 
not do these things because of defendants'fraud. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS CANNOT NOW ARGUE THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION. 
Defendants in the court below argued that plaintiffs' Second, Seventh and Eighth 
Claim were barred by statute of limitations; however, the district court did not decide these 
limitations issues. 
Defendants cannot now argue that limitations apply. Defendants' own brief states as 
follows in their arguments relating to detrimental reliance: 
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of loss, and no such loss can possibly be 
determined until the property is actually sold. Because plaintiffs have incurred 
no definable loss, their claims are not ripe for adjudication. 
See Appellees' Brief at 11. 
According to defendants' own summary of argument, defendants argue not only has 
the statute of limitations not run, plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for adjudication even today. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, alleging a failure to develop the property under the second 
claim for relief- breach of fiduciary duty, the seventh claim for relief- breach of contract, 
and the eighth claim for relief- fraud and deceit, was first filed in March of 1990. It is true 
that plaintiffs knew that the property was not on the market from 1982 through the date the 
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Complaint was filed. However, during that time, the defendants were either concealing 
information from the Changs as to the status of the development and their plans for the 
property or simply misrepresenting the status of the project and their intentions regarding it. 
Defendants repeatedly stated that the property would soon be on the market, and provided 
plaintiffs with otherwise misleading information. Despite numerous requests for 
information, it was not until October of 1989 that the Changs were informed as to the Lins' 
position and philosophy regarding Soldier Summit when the Lins announced that the project 
would not be developed. 
Utah law does not permit a party to lull a potential adversary into a false sense of 
security and thereby subject the adversary's claim to the bar of a statute of limitations 
defense: 
Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable 
adjustment of this claim will be made may create an estoppel against pleading 
the statute of limitations. 
Rice v. Granite School Dist. 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969), (quoting North v. Culmer, 
193 So. 2d 701, 705 (Fla. App. 1963)). This is exactly what defendants have done in this 
case. 
Plaintiffs' claims are tolled until discovery by the aggrieved party of "facts 
constituting fraud or breach due to the misleading actions of defendants." Plaintiffs did not 
learn of the fraud or the fact that defendants were not abiding by the Separation Agreement 
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or the amendment until 1989 at the earliest. Therefore, the tort, fraud and contract claims did 
not accrue until that date. 
Here, the defendants lulled plaintiffs into believing that the property would be 
developed as planned. Based upon those representations, plaintiffs did not act to protect their 
interests until 1990. 
In Butcher v. Gilroy. 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987), the Butchers and Gilroy 
stipulated to the entry of a written settlement agreement to resolve disputes among them. 
The agreement vested in Gilroy title in certain land, and required Gilroy to sell the land by 
April, 1976 and split the proceeds of that sale with the Butchers. 
Both parties attempted to sell the land, but were delayed by various subdivision 
development changes and watershed questions. Finally, in 1982, Gilroy sold the property, 
but he did not inform the Butchers of the sale and did not account for them for their share of 
the proceeds. Rather, he continued to encourage the Butchers in their attempt to secure a 
buyer and informed them that he was also continuing his efforts to sell the property. 
In 1984, the Butchers learned of the 1982 sale and brought an action against Gilroy 
seeking an accounting in their share of the proceeds. Gilroy moved to dismiss the Complaint 
arguing that the Butchers' claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23, the six year 
statute of limitations applicable to written instruments. The trial court granted the Motion 
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reasoning that the cause of action accrued in 1976 when Gilroy failed to sell the property as 
required by the parties' settlement agreement. 744 P.2d at 312. 
This Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that there are important exceptions to 
the general rule that a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary 
to complete the cause of action: 
[I]n some circumstances, where the statute of limitations would normally bar 
a claim, proof of concealment or misleading by the defendant precludes the 
defendant by raising the statute of limitations defense. 
744P.2dat314. 
The opinion in Butcher is controlling here. Due to their own misleading actions, due 
to their own misleading statements, due to their own acts giving plaintiffs a false sense of 
security, defendants are estopped from asserting the statutes of limitation defenses. 
Also, as stated in Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 1377 (Utah App. 1993) (Orme, J., 
concurring in the result): 
Generally, "a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action." (Citation omitted.) 
In a typical case, the application of this rule is reasonably straightforward 
because a single event occurs, such as a punch in the nose, a trespass upon 
one's property, which completes a cause of action. Courts, however, have 
adapted to rarer instances where a defendant's wrongful actions occur over a 
period of time. In such cases 'where a continuous chain of events or course of 
conduct is involved, the cause of action accrues at the time of the final act in 
that series of events or course of conduct.' (Citation omitted.) 
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The focus of an inquiry into whether plaintiffs' allegations are covered by the 
continuing wrong theory is on the defendants' wrongful activities. 
Defendants contend that the plaintiffs' fiduciary duty and contract claims are barred 
somehow in 1984 because defendants wrongfully failed to market the Soldier Summit 
property in 1982 through 1984. The defendants still wrongfully failed and still had a 
contractual duty to develop and market that property from 1985 forward. The defendants 
concealed their fraud by lulling the plaintiffs into a false sense of security, and lied to the 
plaintiffs until 1989 when defendants announced that they had done nothing concerning the 
property and intended to do nothing. Even to this day, the defendants continue to breach 
their duties to plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Order of Summary Judgment 
and the case remanded for trial under the second, seventh and eighth claims for relief. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 1998. 
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